Exercise 3.1.4: prove that a subset of the naturals is definable in the naturals (with language 0, S) iff it is either finite or cofinite.
Exercise 3.1.5: prove that the < relation is not definable in the naturals (with language 0, S).
Exercise 3.1.6: prove that the theory of the naturals (with language 0, S) is not finitely axiomatizable.
Exercise 3.3.1: prove that the following are definable in the naturals (with language *, E):
sum(x,y,z)
which is true iff
x+y=z
zero(x)
which is true iff x is zerosucc(x,y)
which is true iff
x+1=y
Exercise 3.3.8: prove that if functions g and h are representable in AE, then so is the function f defined by natural successor recursion on g and h.
We already know that there are sentences that AE can
neither prove nor disprove; we already know that the set of sentences it
can prove isn't recursive; and we already know that the set of sentences
it can disprove isn't recursive.
But it's worse than that: you can't even recursively draw a
line between the provable and the disprovable.
Exercise 3.5.1:
prove that there is no recursive set that
"separates" things that AE can prove from things that
AE can disprove.
Exercise 3.6.9: prove that the set of programs that halt on at least two different inputs is Σ1 but not Π1.
Exercise 3.6.14: prove that various sets of programs are at various levels of the arithmetic hierarchy.
Exercise 3.7.1: Let σ be a statement that asserts its own provability in AE. Is σ actually provable in AE? Convince me of your answer.